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Abstract
Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby
Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements.
Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility
of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions
and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a
simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across con-
stituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive,
while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We
show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their
own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the
determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was ﬁrst introduced) and
2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.
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Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the trade negotiating authority granted by the Congress of the
United States to the President. The crucial feature of this institutional procedure is that, when
the President negotiates trade agreements under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject them,
but cannot amend their content. While congressional and private sector leaders are consulted
throughout the negotiations, the fact that the ﬁnal agreement is presented to Congress as a
package assures trading partners that any solution they reach with the U.S. executive will not
be renegotiated.
Fast track procedures played a crucial role during the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations, as well as in the negotiations of all major free trade agreements
involving the Unites States.1 The recent expiration of FTA on July 1, 2007 is likely to endanger
the already troubled Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations,2 as well as ongoing bilateral
negotiations between the Unites States and various other countries. The objective of this paper
is to examine the determinants of congressmen’s decision to grant or not fast track authority
to the President and to understand the impact of this decision on the outcome of international
trade negotiations.
For this purpose, we develop a simple model of trade relations between two large countries,
home (representing the Unites States) and foreign, which are characterized by similar economic
features, but diﬀerent trade policy institutions. In the foreign country, the authority to negotiate
trade agreements is delegated to the executive, while in the home country, Congress can retain
the possibility to amend trade deals. Each legislator in the home Congress will vote for or
against FTA so as to maximize his expected utility, anticipating the impact that FTA (or lack
thereof) will have on the outcome of the negotiations with the foreign country. We argue that
this decision is eﬀectively equivalent to choosing between two diﬀerent country representatives:
the President (in the case of FTA) and the majority of Congress (in case of no FTA). Hence the
choice of fast track procedures will only have an impact on trade negotiations if the preferences
of the President do not coincide with those of the majority of Congress.
In our setup, the executive represents the interests of the country as a whole, while each
congressman stands for its own electoral constituency. In terms of their trade preferences,
legislators can diﬀer from each other and from the executive, as a result of an uneven geographical
distribution of production activities. Compared to the President, representatives from districts
1The only free trade agreement which the Unites States did not negotiate under fast track authority was
the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement. As stated by Jagdish Bhagwati in a recent interview with the Council of
Foreign Relations, “every time there’s been something big and complicated—certainly the big multilateral ones,
and even the big bilateral ones like NAFTA—they had to go through fast track” (see www.cfr.org).
2The director-general of the World Trade Organization, Pascal Lamy, warned that the Doha Round “will fail
unless we get some sort of extension to the fast track” (Sunday Telegraph, December 3, 2006).
1that are specialized in the production of import-competing (export) goods are less (more) willing
to trade oﬀ reductions in domestic import tariﬀs with reductions in foreign import taxes.
Our theoretical model predicts that representatives of constituencies with higher stakes in
import-competing industries will tend to vote against FTA, while representatives of more export-
oriented constituencies may vote in favor or against, depending on the degree of protectionism
of the majority of Congress. The intuition behind this result is that more export-oriented
constituencies, which are eager to reach an agreement with the foreign country, may gain from
being represented by a more protectionist negotiating party, which is able to achieve a more
favorable deal. This is in line with results obtained in the literature on strategic delegation,
which shows that principals may gain by delegating decision-making power to status quo-biased
agents, to increase their “bargaining power” in negotiations (e.g., Schelling, 1956; Jones, 1989;
Segendorﬀ, 1998). Having one’s hands tied domestically can thus help to extract concessions in
international negotiations: “...the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to
make concessions and to meet demands” (Shelling (1956), p. 19).
To test the predictions of our theoretical model concerning FTA voting decisions, we examine
the determinants of all FTA votes which have taken place in the U.S. Congress between 1974
(when fast track was ﬁrst introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted). We distinguish be-
tween three types of legislators—import, export and non-specialized—depending on the stakes
of their constituencies in import-competing and export industries. In line with the predictions
of our theoretical model, we show that a congressman is signiﬁcantly more likely to vote in favor
of granting or extending FTA the more his constituency is specialized in export production com-
pared to the Unites States at large. Moreover, in scenarios in which none of the legislator types
has a majority in Congress, the likelihood that representatives of non-specialized constituencies
support FTA decreases with their own share of seats.
In terms of negotiation outcomes, we show that lack of fast track tends to skew trade pol-
icy outcomes in favor of the home country. This result can explain why foreign countries are
reluctant to negotiate trade agreements with the U.S. when Congress retains amendment power
and suggests that U.S. legislators may use fast track procedures to try to shift the terms of
the agreements closer to their own preferred outcome. Our analysis builds on the literature on
“two-level games” (Putnam, 1988), which has stressed the interactions between domestic politics
and international negotiations. While this literature has considered several important aspects of
the process of endogenous formation of trade policies (e.g., Mayer, 1981; Grossman and Help-
man, 1995; Broda et al., 2007), somewhat surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to the
workings of fast track procedures and their impact on trade negotiations.
Our paper also builds on the vast literature in political science that has examined the evo-
lution of U.S. trade policy institutions (e.g., Lohmann and O’Halloran, 1994; Bailey and Brady,
21998; Hiscox, 1999).3 To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to focus on FTA,
providing a fully microfounded theoretical model to understand the determinants of this institu-
tion and its impact on U.S. trade relations. Finally, our paper also contributes to the empirical
literature which has examined the determinants of congressional trade policy decisions (e.g.,
Kahane, 1996; Box-Steﬀenmeier et al., 1997; Baldwin and Magee, 2000a,b).4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy describe the
history of fast track procedures. In Section 3, we develop a simple model of trade negotiations
between two large countries. Section 4 introduces the trade policy preferences of Congress
representatives, examines the determinants of FTA voting behavior and the implications of fast
track for trade negotiations. Sections 5 describes the data used in our empirical analysis, while
Section 6 presents our methodology and our results. Section 7 reports the results of various
robustness checks. Finally, Section 8 provides some concluding remarks.
2 A Brief History of Fast Track Authority
The U.S. Constitution explicitly assigns authority over foreign trade to Congress. Article I,
section 8, gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations ...” and to
“...lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises...”. Under Article II, however, the President
is granted exclusive authority to negotiate treaties and international agreements and exercises
broad authority over the conduct of the nation’s foreign aﬀairs. Hence, both legislative and
executive authorities have a role to play in the development and execution of U.S. trade policy.
For roughly the ﬁrst 150 years of the United States, Congress exercised its authority over
foreign trade by setting tariﬀ rates on all imported products. Tariﬀs were the main trade
policy instrument, and a primary source of federal revenues. During this period, the President’s
primary role in setting trade policy was in negotiating and implementing bilateral trade treaties
with the advice and consent of Congress. In the 1930’s, two legislative events radically changed
3Most of these studies have focused on the impact of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934.
As discussed in Section 2, this was the ﬁrst bill in which Congress delegated trade policy to the President.
Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994) present a theoretical model of distributive politics in which legislators delegate
policymaking to the President to avoid being trapped in ineﬃcient logrolling. Their analysis cannot be applied
to understand the implications of fast track authority on trade negotiations, since it focuses only on one country.
Bailey and Brady (1998) use a spatial model to show how reciprocity in trade agreements can help to solve the
collective action problems of exporters. Notice that in their analytical framework, the preferences of the legislators
are simply assumed rather than being derived from a fully microfounded trade model. Similarly to our analysis,
Hiscox (1999) models trade policy decisions in Congress as being shaped by diﬀerences in the endowments of
speciﬁc factors across constituencies; however, his analysis is focused only on one country, and thus cannot be
applied to examine how trade policy delegation aﬀects the strategic interaction between countries.
4In this literature, the paper which is closest to ours is Baldwin and Magee (2000a), who examine the deter-
minants of three votes taken by Congress in 1993-1994 (on NAFTA, the Uruguay Round Agreement, and the
most-favored nation status to China).
3the shape and conduct of U.S. trade policy. The ﬁrst was the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act,
which raised import duties to record levels and was widely blamed at the time for sharply
reducing trade, triggering retaliatory moves by many other countries, and exacerbating the
Great Depression (see Irwin, 1997). The second important piece of legislation was the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, which gave the President the authority to undertake
tariﬀ-reduction agreements with foreign countries. The crucial feature of the RTAA was that the
President could implement trade agreements by proclamation, i.e., with no need for congressional
approval, although the RTAA itself required periodic renewal. The idea behind the RTAA was
to undo the damage created by Smoot-Hawley, unwinding beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies
through negotiated tariﬀ reductions. Under the authority of the RTAA, the executive reached
numerous bilateral trade agreements in the late 1930s and negotiated the General Agreement on
Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress granted again RTAA authority for ﬁve
years. This allowed President Johnson to negotiate the Kennedy Round (1963-1967), in which
GATT members reached an agreement on a number of tariﬀ reductions. However, since this
agreement also involved interventions in two areas related to non-tariﬀ barriers (customs valua-
tion and antidumping practices), some congressmen argued that the President had overstepped
his authority. The outcome of the Kennedy Round made evident that non-tariﬀ barriers would
increasingly dominate the agenda of future trade negotiations. As a result, when Congress con-
sidered a new grant of authority for the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, it decided to
maintain ﬁnal control over non-tariﬀ agreements.
The process ultimately agreed upon in the Trade Act of 1974 is what is known as “fast
track”. Three key features characterize this institutional procedure. First, the act stipulates that
agreements involving non-tariﬀ barriers cannot enter into force by presidential proclamation, but
need to be approved by Congress. Second, under fast track authority, Congress cannot amend
a trade agreement once it has been submitted for approval.5 Finally, the Trade Act of 1974
requires Congress to consider trade agreement implementing bills within mandatory deadlines
and with a limitation on debate.6
5During the drafting of the Trade Act of 1974, it was recognized that trading partners would be unwilling to
negotiate agreements that would be subject to unlimited congressional debate and amendments. As stated in
the Senate Finance Committee report accompanying the legislation: “The Committee recognizes ... that such
agreements negotiated by the Executive should be given an up-or-down vote by the Congress. Our negotiators
cannot be expected to accomplish the negotiating goals ... if there are no reasonable assurances that the negotiated
agreements would be voted up-or-down on their merits. Our trading partners have expressed an unwillingness to
negotiate without some assurances that the Congress will consider the agreements within a deﬁnite time-frame.”
6Each house can debate the bill for no more than 20 hours. The entire Congressional consideration can take
no longer than 90 legislative days.
4Table 1: Votes authorizing or extending FTA
Bill Description Vote in House Vote in Senate
H.R. 10710 First approval of FTA Dec. 11, 1973 Dec. 20, 1974
Trade Act of 1974 Other provisions: escape clause, antidumping, countervailing (272-140) (72-4)
duties, trade adjustment assistance, GSP
H.R. 4537 Extension of FTA July 11, 1979 July 23, 1979
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 Other provisions: implementation of Tokyo Round (395-7) (90-4)
H.R. 4848 Approval of FTA July 13, 1988 Aug. 3, 1988
Omnibus Trade and Other provisions: strengthening of unilateral trade retaliation (376-45) (85-11)
Competitiveness Act instruments, authority of USTR
H.Res. 101 Disapproval of extension of FTA May 23, 1991
(192-231)
S.Res. 78 Disapproval of extension of FTA May 24, 1991
(36-59)
H.R. 1876 Extension of FTA June 22, 1993 June 30, 1993
(295-126) (76-16)
H.R. 2621 Approval of FTA (denied) Sept. 25, 1998
(180-243)
H.R. 3009 Approval of FTA July 27, 2002 Aug. 1, 2002
Trade Act of 2002 Other provisions: Andean Trade Preference Act, trade (215-212) (64-34)
adjustment assistance, GSP
Sources: Destler (2005) and Smith (2007).
Notes: Only ﬁnal votes are reported; with the exception of the votes in 1991, the ﬁrst (second) number in parenthesis refers to
votes in favor of the bill (against it). The Senate did not vote on the bill of 1998, since the House had already rejected it.-
1974 1979 1988 1991 1993 1998 2002
Fta granted
      
Ford
      
Carter
      
Reagan




Figure 1: Conferrals of FTA
Additional provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 involve restrictions on the President’s powers
under FTA. In particular, in his request for trade negotiating authority the executive must
specify what types of agreements it will be used for and what his negotiating objectives will
be. Furthermore, he has to consult with Congress during the course of the negotiations and
during the drafting of the implementing legislation. Finally, Congress sets a deadline by which
the negotiations have to be completed if fast-track procedures are to apply.7
Table 1 reports the outcome of all the votes which were called in Congress to authorize
or extend fast track authority. Notice that some of the listed bills focus solely on fast track
negotiating authority, while others include other trade provisions. The only episode of denial
of a FTA request is represented by bill H.R. 2621 of September 25, 1998, when the Clinton
administration was defeated by a 243 to 180 majority.
Figure 1 above illustrates the periods in which FTA has been granted since the Trade Act of
1974. As it can be seen, every President has enjoyed FTA, with the exception of Bill Clinton,
who failed to obtain it between 1994 and 2001. Notice also that FTA has been granted for
periods of diﬀerent length and has often spanned more than one presidency.
From Table 2 below, we can see that all the most important multilateral and preferential
trade agreements signed by the United States have been negotiated under fast track procedures.
Presidential fast track trade negotiating authority, renamed “trade promotion authority” by the
George W. Bush administration, was last renewed with the Trade Act of 2002. This allowed the
United Stated to implement several free trade agreements with countries such as Australia and
Chile and to negotiate additional bilateral trade deals with Panama, South Korea and Colombia.
FTA expired on July 1, 2007. Without renewal of fast track, it has been argued that the cur-
rent administration has “diminished leverage to pursue additional trade deals, and the prospects
for completion of the Doha Round of global trade talks, as well as several proposed bilateral
7See Destler (1997), Brainard and Shapiro (2001), and Smith (2007) for more details on fast track procedures.
6U.S. trade deals, remain bleak” (Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2007).8
Table 2: Bills negotiated under FTA
Bill Status Votes/Signature Date
Trade Agreement Act of 1979 Approved Tokyo Round Agreements July 1979
U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Approved free trade area May 1985
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Approved free trade area Aug./Sept. 1988
NAFTA Approved free trade area between Nov. 1993
United States, Canada and Mexico
Uruguay Round Approved Uruguay Round Agreements Nov./Dec. 1994
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Area Approved free trade area July 2003
U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Area Approved free trade area July 2003
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Area Approved free trade area July 2004
U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Area Approved free trade area July 2004
U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central Approved free trade area between July 2005
America Free Trade Area United States, Dominican Republic,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua
U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Area Approved free trade area Dec. 2005
U.S.-Oman Free Trade Area Approved free trade area July/Sept. 2006
U.S.-Peru Free Trade Area Approved free trade area Nov./Dec. 2007
U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Area Awaiting congressional approval November 2006
U.S.-Panama Free Trade Area Awaiting congressional approval June 2007
U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Area Awaiting congressional approval June 2007
3 A Simple Model of Trade Negotiations
To analyze the working of FTA, we introduce a standard model of trade relations between two
large countries , “home” and “foreign” (represented by a “*”), in which trade is the result of
diﬀerences in factor endowments. Each country is made up of several electoral constituencies,
which are heterogeneous with respect to their stakes in import-competing and export industries.
Elected oﬃcials represent the interests of their own constituencies: legislators stand for their
own electoral districts, while the executive stands for the entire country. Our analysis thus
emphasizes the role played by the size of the congressmen’s and the President’s constituencies,
and the geographic heterogeneity in the distribution of economic activities. This implies that the
President has generally diﬀerent preferences than the majority of Congress and is more attuned
8It is still not clear how the expiration of fast track will aﬀect the outstanding bilateral trade pacts with
Panama, South Korea and Colombia. Some claim that, since these agreements have been negotiated before the
expiration deadline, they should be considered by Congress under fast track procedures. Others argue instead
that a renewal of FTA is necessary (see Smith, 2007).
7to “the public interest” compared to individual legislators, as suggested by Baldwin (1985) and
Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994), among others.
In this section, we examine international negotiations between the benevolent executives of
the two countries.9 The core of our analysis is presented in the following section, in which we
allow legislators in the home country to choose whether or not to delegate trade negotiating
authority to the President.
Each economy is characterized by three sectors, i = 0,1,2, where 0 denotes a numeraire
good. The numeraire good is traded freely across countries and is produced using labor alone.
We choose units so that the international and domestic price of good 0 are both equal to one. We
assume that aggregate labor supply, L = L∗, is large enough to sustain production of a positive
amount of good 0. This implies that in a competitive equilibrium the wage rate equals unity in
each country. Goods 1 and 2 are manufactured using labor and a sector-speciﬁc input, which is
available in ﬁxed supply. Home is abundant in sector-speciﬁc input 2, while foreign is abundant
in sector-speciﬁc input 1. As a result, home imports good 1, while foreign imports good 2. We
will assume perfect symmetry in the factor endowments between the two countries. The domestic
and international price of a nonnumeraire good i are denoted by pi and πi, respectively. With
a wage rate equal to unity, the total rent Ri accruing to the speciﬁc factor in sector i depends
only on the producer price of the good, and can thus be expressed as Ri(pi). Industry supply is
given by Qi(pi) = ∂Ri/∂pi.
Trade policies in the two countries consist of ad valorem import tariﬀs or subsidies, denoted
by τ and τ∗, which drive a wedge between domestic and international prices. In the home
country, the domestic price of good 1 is thus equal to p1 = (1 + τ)π1, with τ > 0 (τ < 0)
representing an import tariﬀ (subsidy); the domestic price of the export good is instead equal
to p2 = π2. In the foreign country, domestic prices are given by p∗
1 = π1 and p∗
2 = (1 + τ∗)π2.10
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents, and the size of the population is
normalized to one. Each agent in [0,1] shares the same, quasi-linear and additively separable
preferences, which can be written as




9To isolate the role of geography, similarly to Grossman and Helpman (2005), we do not model the role of
interest groups in shaping trade policy. Explicitly modeling the role of lobbies would require examining how
pressure groups interact with diﬀerent branches of government. As long as the preferences of the executive and
the legislators are not perfectly aligned, the main thrust of our analysis would not be aﬀected.
10Following Johnson (1953-4) and Mayer (1981), we restrict the set of policy tools available to import tariﬀs
and subsidies. This allows us to describe the preferences of the two countries in the tariﬀ space (τ,τ∗) and to
easily characterize trade negotiations between them. Levy (1999), in his model of lobbying and international
cooperation, has convincingly argued that export subsidies and taxes are rarely used, the only exception being
probably agriculture (see also Hoeckman and Kostecki, 2001).
8where c0 represents the consumption of the numeraire good, and c1 and c2 represent the con-
sumption of nonnumeraire goods. The utility functions are assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable,
increasing, and strictly concave.
Provided that income always exceeds the expenditure on the numeraire good, the domestic
demand for good i ∈ {1,2} can be expressed as a function of price alone, Di(pi). Net imports of
good 1 by the home country can then be written as M1(p1) = D1(p1)−Q1(p1) > 0, while foreign























From (2) and (3) we can derive an expression for world equilibrium prices as a function of the
policies in the two countries, i.e., π1(τ), π2(τ∗). Tariﬀ revenues in home are given by
T(t) = τπ1(τ)M1(τ) (4)
and are assumed to be redistributed uniformly to all individuals. The same is true for foreign.
Individuals derive income from various sources: they all own a unit of labor and earn wages
as workers; they also receive the same lump sum transfer (possibly negative) of trade policy
revenues from the government; in addition, some individuals own a share of the speciﬁc inputs
used in the production of goods 1 and 2. Aggregate welfare is deﬁned as the sum of the income of
all citizens (total labor income, industry rents and government revenues), plus consumer surplus,
and for the case of home it can then be written as
W(τ,τ
∗) = 1 + R1(τ) + R2(τ
∗) + T(τ) + Ω(τ,τ
∗), (5)








−p2D2(τ∗) denotes total consumer surplus.
The welfare of the foreign country can be deﬁned symmetrically.
Dropping the sectoral subscript for notational simpliﬁcation, the ﬁrst-order condition for the








Substituting the expression for (dπ/dτ) into (6) yields the standard formula for the home coun-
11This is found by substituting −D(dp/dτ) and Q(dp/dτ) for the derivatives of consumer surplus and industry








Figure 2: Home’s indiﬀerence map




where ε∗ ≡ (dM∗/dp∗)(p∗/M∗) is the elasticity of foreign export supply.
Figure 2 illustrates the home country’s indiﬀerence map in the tariﬀ plane (τ,τ∗). Each
indiﬀerence curve represents the combinations of domestic (τ) and foreign (τ∗) tariﬀs among
which the home country is indiﬀerent. These tariﬀ indiﬀerence curves are denoted by WU,
with welfare increasing as subscript U rises in value. An expression for the slope of the tariﬀ
indiﬀerence curves is derived in the Appendix (see equation (A.2)). There we show analytically
that, for non-negative values of τ, the slope of the home country’s indiﬀerence curves is positive,
zero or negative depending on the home country’s actual tariﬀ rate being less than, equal to, or
larger than its optimal tariﬀ.
Similarly, we can characterize the indiﬀerence curves of the foreign country (see Appendix for
the derivation). Combining information on the preferences of the two countries, we can examine
the scope for trade agreements between them. In what follows, we examine trade negotiations
between home and foreign, which are represented by their benevolent executives.
In Figure 3 below, we illustrate the scope for trade agreements between the two executives,























Figure 3: Trade negotiations between the two Presidents
taking the noncooperative Nash tariﬀ equilibrium point N as the status quo point for the negoti-
ations. Graphically, the tariﬀ war outcome lies at the intersection point between two indiﬀerence
curves of the home and foreign executives, such that both indiﬀerence curves reach a maximum
at that point.13
We make the following standard assumptions about trade agreements:
Assumption 1 The negotiating parties can only agree to tariﬀ combinations that make each of
them at least as well oﬀ as they would be in a tariﬀ war.
Graphically, this assumption implies that trade agreements must be in the lens comprised be-
tween the two indiﬀerence curves going through the Nash equilibrium, WN and W ∗
N. We also
require trade deals to be eﬃcient:
Assumption 2 The negotiating parties can only agree to tariﬀ combinations such that no fur-
ther welfare gains can be achieved by one party without the other one losing.
This assumption implies that agreed tariﬀ combinations must lie on the contract curve (CC in
Figure 3), the locus of all tangency points between the indiﬀerence curves of the two countries.
13The diagram shows a unique Nash equilibrium, which is given by the tariﬀ pair (τN,τ∗
N) such that τN is a
best response to τ∗
N, and vice versa. In general, multiple equilibria cannot be excluded. See Johnson (1953-4)
for a full characterization of Nash equilibria in tariﬀ games.
11In the Appendix, we show that eﬃcient trade deals between the home and foreign country are
characterized by the following condition:
(1 − τǫ
∗)(1 − τ
∗ǫ) − 1 = 0. (8)
Equation (8) states that there exists an inﬁnite number of tariﬀ-subsidy combinations for the
two countries satisfying Assumption 2, which share the feature that if one country imposes a
tariﬀ, the other must oﬀer a subsidy. Tariﬀs in both countries cannot be the outcome of eﬃcient
trade negotiations between the two countries. Free trade is the symmetric, eﬃcient outcome.14
Together, the two assumptions above imply that the two parties agree to combinations of
import tariﬀs (subsidies) which lie on the arc AB of the contract curve in Figure 3. This segment
identiﬁes all possible trade agreements which satisfy the above two assumptions, i.e., they are
in the set of Pareto-improving deals compared to the status quo and are eﬃcient.
We can summarize the information in Figure 3 and derive trade negotiation outcomes by
drawing the utility possibility frontier. This is done in Figure 4, where the origin is point N,
which corresponds to the utility levels in a tariﬀ war, WN and W ∗
N in Figure 3. The curve AB in
Figure 4 represents the utility possibility frontier, which traces the utilities of the two countries










Figure 4: Bargaining between the two Presidents
In order to derive the equilibrium outcome of the trade negotiations, we employ the general-
14See Mayer (1981) for a similar result.
12ized Nash bargaining solution. This implies that the domestic and foreign tariﬀs τ and τ∗ must








where γ ∈ [0,1] captures the relative bargaining strength of the home government.15 If we
consider the case of two symmetric countries, for which γ = 1
2, the outcome of the negotiations
will be point O in Figure 4, which corresponds to the free trade point O in Figure 3.16 If instead
we increase the bargaining power of the home country, the solution will be a point like E where,
as expected, the stronger bargainer does relatively better than its trading partner. In the limit,
when γ = 1 (γ = 0), the equilibrium utility levels are given by point B (A), where the home
(foreign) country gets the maximum level of utility and the foreign (home) country achieves the
same level of utility as in the Nash equilibrium.
4 FTA and Trade Negotiations
In the analysis developed in the previous section, we have assumed that trade negotiations
between home and foreign were carried out by the two executives, who represent the interests
of the nation at large, i.e., one large district made up by all electoral constituencies. In this
section, we introduce a crucial asymmetry between the negotiating countries: for foreign, we
retain the assumption that trade policy is set by the President; for home, we assume instead
that legislators in Congress must decide whether or not to delegate trade negotiating authority
to the President by granting FTA. This allows us to focus on the impact of FTA on the outcomes
of trade negotiations. Later, in Section 8, we discuss the implications of allowing Congress in
both countries to retain amendment power.
The starting point of the political economy model described below is the uneven geographical
distribution of industries across constituencies. This implies that the trade policy preferences
of the members of Congress will be heterogeneous, as they reﬂect the interests of their electoral
districts, which depend on the speciﬁc industries located there.17
15Notice that the parameter γ does not reﬂect the countries’ market power or their costs in case of trade
negotiation failure, which are already captured by the utility possibility frontier; as argued by Binmore et al.
(1986), γ could be interpreted instead as reﬂecting diﬀerences in discount rates.
16It should be stressed that free trade would arise as the outcome of the negotiations between two symmetric
countries even if we used alternative bargaining solutions (e.g., under utilitarian or egalitarian bargaining).
17There is substantial evidence on the importance of geographical industry concentration in shaping trade
policy. See, for example, Hansen (1990) and Busch and Reinhardt (1999). Grossman and Helpman (2005) and
Willmann (2005) show in a small-country trade model how asymmetries in the distribution of industries across
constituencies may lead to a protectionist bias in national legislators.
13It should be stressed that our analysis does not rely on the speciﬁc preferences we have as-
sumed for the President and the legislators, but rather on the fact that the executive’s preferences
do not coincide with those of the majority of Congress.
4.1 Congressional Preferences in the Home Country
In the home country, there are D districts, each populated by h = 1/D individuals and rep-
resented in Congress by one legislator. Consumers in all districts share identical preferences
(equation (1) above) and receive the same transfer from the government. Crucially, districts
diﬀer with respect to their stakes in the production of import-competing and export goods, im-
plying diﬀerent trade policy preferences. In particular, we distinguish between three types of
districts/congressmen:
• Import districts (M): a fraction β
M of the D districts is relatively specialized in the
production of the import-competing good. Each of these districts is characterized by a
share αM
1 (αM
2 ) of rents in the production of import (export) goods, with αM
1 > αM
2 . The
utility function of a representative of one of these districts is thus given by
W
M(τ,τ
∗) = h + α
M




k) + h[T(τ) + Ω(τ,τ
∗)]. (10)
• Export districts(S): a fraction β
S of districts is relatively specialized in the production
of export goods. Each of these districts is characterized by a share αS
1 (αS
2) of the rents
associated with import (export) production, with αS
1 < αS
2. The utility function of a
representative of one of these districts is given by
W
S(τ,τ






k) + h[T(τ) + Ω(τ,τ
∗)]. (11)
• Neutral districts (C): the remaining fraction β
C = 1−β
M −β
S of districts has equal stakes
in the production of all goods, i.e., αC
1 = αC
2 = h. The utility function of a representative
of one of these districts can thus be written as
W
C(τ,τ
∗) = h + hR1(τ) + hR2(τ
∗
k) + h[T(τ) + Ω(τ,τ
∗)], (12)
implying that a C district is just a scaled-down representation of the country’s economy.
Equations (10)-(12) above imply that congressional districts have diﬀerent preferences only due
to the asymmetric distribution of industry rents across them.18 Our formulation assumes homo-
18This implies an interaction between the size of a group of districts in Congress and the policy preferences
of this group. For example, if we increase the share of M districts in Congress by increasing β
M, we must have
14geneous trade preferences within each type of districts (M, S or C), implying no coordination
failure in voting and no role for logrolling. It can be shown, however, that the results of our
analysis would still hold if we allowed for asymmetries within each type of districts.19
More importantly, asymmetries with respect to the geographic location of production activ-
ities across various districts imply diﬀerent preferences over trade policy: M, S and C districts














Figure 5: Preferences of home congressmen
In Figure 5 above we plot the indiﬀerence curves of the three types of districts going through
a generic point Z in the tariﬀ space (τ,τ∗). Notice that the indiﬀerence curves of the neutral C
districts have the same shape as those of the benevolent home executive (represented in Figure 2
above). Furthermore, the indiﬀerence curves of the representative of an import (export) district
M (S) are steeper (ﬂatter) than the indiﬀerence curves of the President (and the C districts).
This reﬂects the fact that districts that are relatively specialized in the production of import-
that each of these districts enjoys a smaller proportion of the rents from the production of the import-competing
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19We could extend our trade model to a setting with N nonnumeraire goods, in which each M (S) district is
relatively specialized in the production of one import-competing (export) good. In this setting, diﬀerent M (S)
districts would have diﬀerent trade policy preferences across sectors, but would gain by coordinating their votes
through logrolling.
20Diﬀerences in trade policy stances across legislators could be attenuated in the presence of compensation
mechanisms like the Trade Adjustment Assistance program. The analysis of the role of transfers is beyond the
scope of this paper (see Magee (2001) and Drazen and Lim˜ ao (forthcoming) on this point).
15competing (export) goods are less (more) willing to trade oﬀ a reduction in domestic import
tariﬀs with a reduction in foreign import taxes. See Appendix for a formal derivation.
4.2 Timing
In the home country, Congress must decide whether or not to delegate trade negotiating au-
thority to the President (granting FTA) or to retain amendment power (not granting FTA).
Each legislator votes to maximize his expected utility, anticipating the impact that FTA (or lack
thereof) will have on the outcome of the negotiations with the foreign country.21 This implies














Figure 6: Timeline of the game
In stage zero, Nature chooses the composition of home Congress, i.e., the share of elected
members of each district type i (captured by the parameters β
i,i ∈ {M,S,C}), as well as their
trade policy preferences (captured by the parameters αi
1 and αi
2, i ∈ {M,S,C}).
In stage 1, a vote is called by simple majority whereby the home Congress decides whether or
not to grant FTA to the President. If FTA is approved, Congress retains the power to accept or
reject negotiated trade deals, but cannot amend them. Therefore, this stage involves a decision
by Congress between partial delegation of trade negotiation authority to the President and no
delegation at all.
In stage 2, the home and foreign executives carry out the negotiations to reach an agreement
involving a reduction in domestic and foreign tariﬀs compared to the status quo (point N in
Figure 3 above).
In stage 3, if FTA has been approved in stage 1, the home Congress reviews the agreement
reached by the two Presidents in stage 2 and accepts or rejects the proposal by simple majority
voting, without the possibility of modifying its content. If instead in stage 1 FTA has not
been granted, Congress retains the possibility of amending any agreement reached by the two
executives in stage 2 by simple majority voting.
21Notice that asymmetries across foreign constituencies will play no role in the negotiations, since we assume
that in the foreign country trade negotiation authority is always fully delegated to the President, who represents
the interests of all constituencies.
16Finally, in stage 4, the President signs or vetoes the agreement into law.22
Before discussing in detail the equilibrium outcome of the game, a few observations are in order.
Firstly, if Congress does not grant FTA to the President in stage 1 of the game and thus any deal
agreed by the two executives in stage 2 can be amended, the game’s outcome is the same as if
the foreign President negotiated a trade deal directly with the majority of the home Congress.23
Secondly, the fact that the home President retains veto power in stage 4 implies that, in the
absence of FTA, Congress cannot put forward trade deals which would make the home country
worse oﬀ than the status quo. Graphically, this rules out trade agreements that lie above the
indiﬀerence curve WN in Figure 3.24
In what follows, we derive predictions about congressmen’s voting behavior and the outcome
of trade negotiations, under alternative scenarios corresponding to diﬀerent compositions of
Congress in stage zero of the game.
4.3 Congress Composition and Voting Behavior
4.3.1 Majority of M Districts
Consider ﬁrst a situation in which the majority of Congress is made up by representatives of
import districts (i.e., β
M > 1
2). To analyze this scenario, we will use Figure 7 below, where
we have replicated the set of feasible agreements that can be reached by the two executives,
lying on the AB portion of the CC curve. We have also drawn the indiﬀerence curve of an M
district representative going through the status quo point, W M
N . This allows us to construct the
set of feasible agreements—satisfying assumptions 1 and 2 above—that can be reached in the
absence of FTA, when Congress majority negotiates directly with the foreign executive. This
set is identiﬁed by the arc A′B′ on the C′C′ curve.
Notice that the set of feasible agreements between the Congress majority and the foreign
executive is smaller than the corresponding set for the two executives. Moreover, the C′C′ curve
lies above the CC curve.25 As a result, in the absence of FTA, free trade cannot be a negotiation
22Article I, section 7 of the U.S. Constitution describes the working of the Presidential veto.
23Note that, in the absence of FTA, any deal negotiated between the Presidents in stage 2 and amended by
the home Congress in stage 3 can be further amended by the foreign executive. The above description of the
timing of the game implicitly assumes that it is too costly to start a new round of trade negotiations between
the two executives once an agreement negotiated under FTA is rejected by the home Congress; renegotiation
is only possible during the amendment phase in stage 3, if the home President has not been granted fast track
authority in stage 1. Notice, however, that in equilibrium there will be no amendments and no renegotiation.
This is because, when the home President lacks FTA, the two executives will negotiate in stage 2 anticipating
Congress’ behavior in the following stage.
24In the absence of FTA, the President’t veto power imposes a diﬀerent constraint on the negotiation outcomes
than Assumption 1 above, since agreements reached between the majority of home Congress and the foreign
President could imply a welfare loss from the point of view of the home country (see discussion below).



















Figure 7: Trade negotiation between foreign President and M majority
outcome. Also, unlike the case of trade negotiations between the two benevolent executives,
outcomes in which both countries set positive import tariﬀs are now possible.
We can show that the M district representatives will never vote in favor of FTA. To this end,
we need to compare the welfare of these agents when they negotiate directly with the foreign
President and when they instead delegate trade negotiation authority to the executive. Using
the generalized Nash bargaining solution described by equation (9) above, we can establish the
following: ﬁrst, if the foreign party enjoys all the bargaining power (i.e., γ = 0) the outcome A′
always yields a higher utility to the M district than the outcome A; analogously, if home enjoys
all the bargaining power (i.e., γ = 1) the M districts are always better oﬀ at B′ than at B; the
same applies for any given γ ∈ [0,1]. The intuition behind this result is as follows: from the
point of view of the M districts, granting FTA implies delegating trade negotiation authority to
an agent, the President, who does not share their trade preferences. Furthermore, this agent is
less protectionist than the M districts, i.e., more willing to reduce domestic tariﬀs in exchange
for a reduction in foreign tariﬀs and granting FTA would thus weaken home’s bargaining position
vis-` a-vis the foreign country.
To examine the voting behavior of the C and S representatives in this scenario, consider
Figure 8.26 Let us start by focusing on the preferences of the C district, which have the same
one of home’s executive. Thus the tangency between the indiﬀerence curves of the M representatives and of the
executive must lie to the right and above point B. The same argument applies to any point on the CC arc.





















Figure 8: Trade negotiation between foreign President and M majority
shape as those of the home country as a whole. Comparing points A and A′, we can see
immediately that when foreign has all the bargaining power, C prefers to vote against FTA. If
instead home has all the bargaining power, C prefers the outcome B to the outcome B′ and
would thus vote in favor of FTA. In the case of identical bargaining power, if M preferences are
as represented in Figure 8, C prefers outcome E to the free trade outcome O.27 This implies
that the neutral representatives may prefer to vote against FTA and thus to delegate the trade
negotiation authority to the protectionist majority of Congress rather than to the President.
This is true even if the C districts and the President share the same trade preferences. This
result is in line with ﬁndings of the literature on strategic delegation, which shows how principals
may gain by delegating policymaking to status-quo biased agents, to increase their bargaining
power in negotiations with other parties (e.g., Schelling, 1956; Jones, 1989; Segendorﬀ, 1998).
Turning now to the S representatives, in the case illustrated in Figure 8, they will also prefer
A′ to A and B to B′. Hence, the more export-oriented S districts may also in some cases prefer to
vote against FTA, strategically delegating trade negotiation authority to a protectionist majority
in Congress. However, the likelihood of this happening is lower than for the C districts, since
the trade preferences of the S export districts diﬀer more from those of the M import districts,
FTA is granted or not. We will assume that, whenever the outcome is independent of a legislator’s vote, he will
still cast his vote according to his preferences.
27For generic M preferences, this will be the case: WA′ > WA, WB′ < WB and WE′ ⋚ WE, where E and E′
are the outcomes of the negotiations for intermediate bargaining weights (i.e., γ ∈ [0,1]).
19making delegation more costly. For example, in the case of identical bargaining power, if M
preferences are as represented in Figure 8, S representatives prefer outcome O to outcome E.28
4.3.2 Majority of S Districts
Next, consider a scenario in which the representatives of the S export districts are the majority
in Congress (i.e., β
S > 1
2). To analyze this case, we will use Figure 9 below. Again, the set of
feasible agreements that can be reached under FTA is represented by the AB segment of the CC
curve. Feasible agreements that can be reached in the absence of FTA, when Congress majority
negotiates directly with the foreign executive, are instead identiﬁed by the portion A′B′ of the
C′C′ curve. Point V represents the trade agreement that is eﬃcient from the point of view of
the S majority and the foreign executive and gives the same level of utility to the home country
than the status quo. Notice that the President’s veto power in the last stage of the game rules



















Figure 9: Trade negotiation between foreign President and S majority
In contrast to the case of a majority of M districts discussed above, in this scenario, the set
of feasible agreements between the Congress majority and the foreign executive is larger than
the corresponding set for the two executives. Moreover, the C′C′ curve now lies below the CC
28For generic M preferences, the following holds: WS
A′ ⋚ WS
A, WB′ < WB and WS
E′ ⋚ WS
E, where E and E′
are the outcomes of the negotiations for γ ∈ [0,1].
20curve.29 Notice that, like in the M majority case, in the absence of FTA, free trade is not a
possible negotiation outcome.
It is easy to verify that in this scenario M and C representatives will always vote in favor of
FTA. This is because, when negotiating with the foreign country, they will always prefer to be
represented by the President than by the S majority, since the executive is less eager to reach an
agreement and is thus able to achieve a more favorable deal.30 This establishes that it cannot be
beneﬁcial for a home legislator to delegate trade negotiation authority to an agent who is keener
than himself to reach an agreement with the foreign country.
Next, we turn to the voting behavior of S representatives. In line with our previous discussion
about strategic delegation, we can show that, although these representatives have a majority in
Congress, they might still prefer to vote in favor of FTA and delegate trade negotiation authority
to the executive.31
4.3.3 Majority of C Districts
Consider now the scenario in which the majority of Congress is made up of representatives of
the neutral C districts (i.e., β
C > 1
2). Since the preferences of these districts coincide with
those of the entire country and thus of the President, negotiations between the majority of home
Congress and the foreign executive can be described using Figure 3 above. This implies that
fast track procedures will not aﬀect the outcome of the negotiations.
In this case, there would be no reason to grant fast track authority to prevent amendments of
trade agreements by the majority of Congress. However, if legislators are impatient, they might
still prefer to vote in favor of FTA, so as to speed up the implementation of trade agreements (see
our discussion in Section 2 concerning the mandatory deadlines and limitations on congressional
debate imposed by fast track procedures). We should thus expect C and S representatives to
always vote in favor of FTA, while M representatives may vote in favor or against it. To verify
this, notice from Figure 3 that any outcome on the AB segment of the CC contract curve is
always weakly (strongly) preferred by the C (S) district representatives to the status quo N.32
29See footnote 25 for the argument.
30It can be easily shown that, for any given γ, an outcome on the AB curve is always preferred to the
corresponding outcome on the A′B′ curve. Only in the limit case in which γ = 0, C districts would be indiﬀerent
between granting FTA or not. In this case, because of the President’s veto power, both negotiation procedures
would yield a level of utility WN for the C districts.
31This is the case when the two countries have similar bargaining strength. Note that in the extreme case in
which foreign has all the bargaining power (γ = 0), S representatives would be in favor of FTA if the President
had no veto power (WS
A′ < WS
A) but are against FTA when the President has veto power (WS
V > WS
A). In the
opposite extreme (γ = 1), S representatives always oppose FTA (WS
B′ > WS
B). For intermediate values of γ, we
have WS
E ⋚ WS
E′, where E and E′ are the negotiation outcomes achieved with or without FTA.
32As discussed above, these congressmen may actually prefer to be represented in the negotiations by a more
protectionist majority. However, this is not an option when β
C > 1
2.
21Representatives of the M districts, on the other hand, may or may not be better oﬀ in a trade
agreement compared to the status quo of Nash tariﬀs.
4.3.4 No Majority
Finally, let us examine the scenario in which none of the district types enjoys a majority in
Congress, i.e., β
i < 1
2 for all i ∈ {M,S,C}. This implies that in the absence of FTA, amendments
in stage 3 of the game can only be passed by a coalition of district representatives.
For simplicity, we assume that, if a coalition is formed between two groups in Congress, its
preferences are given by a weighted sum of the preferences of their members, where the weights
are given by each group’s share in Congress.
In line with our analysis of the previous scenario, we can show that it will never be in the
interest of the C or M congressmen to form a coalition with the S representatives. The intuition
behind this result is that, relative to a scenario in which trade negotiation authority is delegated
to the President, forming this coalition would always weaken home’s bargaining position vis-` a-vis
the foreign country. Given this, the only possible coalition in the amendment phase is between
the C and M districts. While for the M representatives being in such coalition will always
be preferable than supporting FTA, the same is not always true for C. Below we show that
the voting behavior of the C representative depends crucially on how protectionist the resulting
coalition would be.







Negotiations between the coalition and the foreign executive in case of no FTA can be captured
by Figure 7 above, where now W M
N should be interpreted as representing W
C,M
N . Notice that, the
steeper is W
C,M
N , the more likely it is that the C districts will vote for FTA rather than joining
the coalition. The intuition is that when the coalition becomes too protectionist, delegation to
a more status-quo biased agent becomes too costly.
The degree of protectionism of the coalition of C and M districts is captured by the slope of






























  . (14)
Comparing (14) with equations (A.1) and (A.6) in the Appendix, we can easily show that the
coalition’s indiﬀerence curves are ﬂatter than the indiﬀerence curves of the M representatives,
but steeper than those of the C representatives. It is also straightforward to verify that an
22increase in β
C will make the indiﬀerence curves of the coalition ﬂatter; in turn, this will make
C representatives more likely to vote against FTA.
As far as S representatives are concerned, they will tend to vote in favor of FTA, preferring
the negotiation outcomes that would emerge when home is represented by the President to those
that would arise when home is represented by the coalition of C and M districts. However,
if this coalition is not too protectionist, the opposite might be true, particularly if the foreign
country enjoys a larger bargaining power (i.e., γ → 1). This is in line with our discussion of the
voting behavior of S representatives in the case of M majority.
4.4 FTA and International Trade Agreements
The analysis carried out in the previous sections allows us to formulate two main results con-
cerning the impact of fast track procedures on the outcome of trade negotiations between home
and foreign.
Proposition 1 Unless β
C > 1
2, free trade can only be achieved under FTA.
To verify this, notice that under fast track authority the set of eﬃcient trade agreements is
identiﬁed by the CC contract curve in Figure 3 above, which goes through the free trade point
0. In the absence of FTA, the contract curve will be either above the CC curve (C′C′ in Figure
7) or below it (C′C′ in Figure 9), depending on the type of Congress composition, and will thus
not pass through point 0.33
Proposition 2 Unless β
S > 1
2, foreign prefers to negotiate with home under FTA.
In the absence of FTA, it is as if the foreign executive negotiates directly with the majority
in the home Congress. Except for the case in which the export-oriented S representatives hold a
majority of seats in Congress (β
S > 1
2), this leads to worse negotiation outcomes from the point
of view of the foreign country than those that could be achieved under FTA. The intuition behind
this result is that lack of FTA strengthens home’s bargaining positions in the negotiations with
foreign.34 This result can explain why foreign countries are often reluctant to negotiate trade
agreements with the United States in the absence of FTA. For example, during the Uruguay
Round, U.S. trade oﬃcials were subject to strong pressures from other GATT members to come
33As discussed above, in the absence of FTA, free trade can only be achieved if C representatives hold a
majority of seats in Congress. In this case, the contract curve identifying eﬃcient agreements between the foreign
executive and the majority of home Congress would coincide with the CC curve in Figure 3.
34This is true for scenarios in which M districts hold a majority of seats in Congress and for scenarios in which
none of the district types enjoys a majority in Congress. For the case of C majority, FTA should not aﬀect
negotiation outcomes; however, foreign should still prefer to negotiate under FTA on the ground that it allows a
faster implementation of trade agreements.
23to the negotiating table with fast track authority. Similarly, Proposition 2 can explain why
Chile only negotiated a free trade agreement with the U.S. in 2003, after the latest renewal of
FTA, rather than during the period between 1994 and 2002, when the executive lacked fast track
authority.
4.5 FTA and Voting Behavior
In what follows, we outline the main ﬁndings concerning the voting behavior of elected con-
gressmen, which we will then bring to the data in Section 6. Our analysis of Section 4.3 shows
that, when voting for or against fast track procedures, home legislators must implicitly decide
who should represent the country in the negotiations with the foreign executive. The choice is
either between oneself and the President (in the case of legislators who control the majority in
Congress); or between the majority in Congress and the President (in the case of legislators who
do not hold a majority).
Strategic delegation concerns crucially aﬀect this choice, since home legislators take into
account the implications of their FTA voting decisions on the outcome of trade negotiations.
The general result that emerges from our analysis is that congressmen will never delegate trade
negotiating authority to the agent who is keener to reach an agreement with the foreign country,
as this will weaken their country’s bargaining position. For example, M representatives will vote
against FTA if they hold a majority in Congress—since in this case the President is the weaker
representative—but will vote in favor of FTA if the S districts hold a majority—since in this
case the President is the tougher bargainer. Similarly, C representatives might decide to vote
against FTA if the majority of Congress is more protectionist than the President, but would
always vote in favor of FTA otherwise.
Furthermore, in our discussion of the four possible scenarios of Congress composition, we
have established that, except for the case in which S districts are a majority in Congress, M
representatives will never vote in favor of FTA, S representatives will be unlikely to vote against,
while C representatives might vote in favor or against. The likelihood that legislator i will vote in
favor of FTA should thus increase in the extent to which his constituency is relatively specialized
in the production of the export good. This implies
Proposition 3 Unless β
S > 1
2, the likelihood that a home legislator votes for FTA increases
with the degree to which his district is export-oriented compared to the country as a whole.
Our analysis in Section 4.3.4 also suggests that, if none of the district types has the majority
in Congress, representatives of the neutral C districts will only vote against FTA in stage 2 of the
game if they can reach more favorable negotiation outcomes by forming a coalition with the M
24representatives in stage 4; in turn, this can only happen if such coalition is not too protectionist,
which is more likely to be the case the larger is β
C. This implies
Proposition 4 If β
i < 1
2 for all i ∈ {M,S,C}, the likelihood of C representatives voting in
favor of FTA decreases with β
C.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we can restate the above two results as follows:
The likelihood of U.S. congressmen voting in favor of FTA increases with the degree to
which their own constituency is relatively export-oriented compared to the U.S. as a whole.
When no legislator type has a majority, the likelihood that representatives from neutral
constituencies vote in favor of FTA decreases with their relative share in Congress.
In Section 4.3, we have examined legislators’ voting behavior in all possible scenarios in terms
of Congress composition: 1) majority of M districts; 2) majority of S districts; 3) majority of
C districts; and 4) no majority. Before describing the details of our empirical investigation,
two remarks are in order concerning the link between our theoretical analysis and its empirical
counterpart. First, as shown in the next section, in our dataset only scenarios 3) and 4) are
veriﬁed. However, this does not pose a problem for our empirical analysis, since the predictions
of Propositions 3 and 4 are valid in those scenarios. Second, we are unlikely to observe votes on
fast track when the majority of Congress is against granting it.35 Again, this is not a concern
for our empirical analysis, which concerns FTA voting behavior of individual U.S. congressmen,
rather than the outcomes of FTA decisions.
5 Data
In the empirical analysis presented below, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions
by U.S. congressmen. The objective of our analysis is to verify whether the legislators’ voting
behavior reﬂects the trade policy interests of their constituencies in the way predicted by our
theoretical model. To do so, we isolate congressmen’s trade policy interests from other factors
which might aﬀect their FTA voting decisions. These include legislators’ party aﬃliation and
ideological preferences, whether they belong to the same party as the President, whether they
are members of the House or the Senate, and whether they have been elected in swing states.
35Indeed, as it can be seen from Table 1, with the exception of House Resolution 2621 of September 25 1998,
all votes ended up with Congress granting FTA. In some situations, the President may decide not to request a
vote on FTA, anticipating that the outcome will be negative. For example, this is what happened in November
1997, when President Clinton agreed to hold oﬀ on the ﬂoor vote in the House, after House Speaker Gingrich
had reportedly said that the vote was 5-25 votes short of passage (see Shoch, 2002).
25Table 3 below provides details of the deﬁnitions and sources for all the variables used in our
regressions (top panel) and in the construction of the regressors (bottom panel).
Table 1 in Section 2 above describes all the votes granting or extending FTA that occurred
in Congress, from the ﬁrst one in 1973 till the last one in 2002. In our theoretical analysis, we
used the words constituency and district interchangeably. Empirically, however, we distinguish
between the 50 states of the U.S.—electing two representatives each for the Senate—and the 435
congressional districts—electing each one member of the House of Representatives.36 Overall,
thirteen votes on FTA have been held in Congress, including the House and Senate resolutions
of disapproval that were rejected in 1991. Seven of them took place in the House, and six in the
Senate. For each vote, the identity of congressmen, their party aﬃliation, their state or district
and their vote (in favor or against FTA) has been collected from roll call voting records.
From our theoretical model, we know that the main determinant of a congressman’s FTA vote
is his constituency’s trade position with respect to the United States at large. To capture the
trade policy interests of a state or congressional district, we collect information on employment in
import and export industries in that constituency. Such variables are relatively easy to construct
for the Senate, since state-level series are readily available. For the House of representatives, on
the other hand, we encountered two main diﬃculties. The ﬁrst problem is that district-speciﬁc
data is not readily available, but must be constructed by aggregating county-level data using
the County Business Patterns (CBP), a survey collected by the Bureau of the Census. Notice
also that a county may be split into diﬀerent districts. For example, as can be seen from Figure
10 below, Santa Clara County in California encompasses four congressional districts, some of
which cover parts of neighboring counties. The second issue is that the geographic deﬁnition of
districts changes overtime, following each decennial Census.
We have addressed these concerns as follows. To obtain district-level date from county level
information, we ﬁrst extract county-level data from the CBP and then aggregate them at the
district level. For those counties split across more than one district, we follow Baldwin and
Magee (2000a,b), among others, imputing employees proportionally to the share of population
of a county assigned to that district. To deal with the problem of redistricting, we have kept
track of changes in the boundaries of the electoral districts that occurred after the Censuses
of 1970, 1980 and 1990. For example, Alaska has always had only one Congressional District;
between the ﬁrst FTA vote in 1973 and the last one in 2002, California went instead from 43 to
52 districts, while New York went from 39 to 31.
36As it can be seen from Table 1, for each decision in the House and Senate less than 435 and 100 votes, are
respectively reported. This is because some congressmen may not be present or may decide to abstain. Moreover,
a seat in Congress may be vacant at any point in time because of special circumstances (e.g., resignation, death).
26Table 3: Deﬁnition of variables and sources
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Votei
t Vote cast by congressman i in year t Up to 1996: ICPSR Study number 4











t Share of C legislators in Congress in year t As for λ
i
t
Senatei Dummy equal to 1 if congressman i is a senator As for Votei
t
Democrati
t Dummy equal to 1 if congressman i is a Democrat in year t As for Votei
t
Conservative ratingi
t Rating (0–100) of congressman i in year t by American Conservative Union http://www.acuratings.org/
Party as Presidenti
t Dummy equal to 1 if congressman i and President belong to same party in year t As for Votei
t
Swing statet
i Dummy equal to 1 if congressman i is from a state in which the margin of Leip (2008)
victory in the last Presidential election was less than 10%
President’s statei
t Dummy equal to 1 if congressman i is from a state won by the President As for Swing state
in the last Presidential election
Uniﬁed governmentt Dummy equal to 1 if in year t the majority of both chambers and the President U.S. Congress
belong to the same party
λ
i
t Employees in year t of district i in export industries divided by employees County Business Patterns
of district i in import industries
λ
US







t districts Dummy equal to 1 if in year t district i is of type S, M, or C As for λ
i
t
Congressional Districts Aggregate of counties included in each district 1973-1982: ICSPR dataset 8258;
1983-2012: provided by Christopher Magee
Import/export industries Industries in which the U.S. is a net importer/exporter Feenstra (1996, 1997), Feenstra et al. (2002),
(annual basis) and U.S. ITC, IMF BoP StatisticsFigure 10: Santa Clara County: Congressional Districts
The CBP report annual data on employment by SIC manufacturing industries up to 1997
and by NAICS manufacturing industries from 1998.37 Notice that employment data in the CBP
are withheld when their disclosure would allow researchers to identify ﬁrms. In such cases, a ﬂag
gives the interval where the actual data belongs to (e.g., between 0 and 19 employees, between
20 and 99 employees and so on). These ﬂags have been used to input values (i.e., the mid point
of each interval) for the missing observations. In order to minimize the problem of undisclosed
data, we use CBP employment data at the 2-digit SIC and 3-digit NAICS levels rather than
at more disaggregated levels. Unfortunately, the CBP do not provide any ﬂag for the data
withheld in 1973. Treating these observations as missing results in a substantial underestimate
of the employment in each county and, consequently, congressional district, which is why we
have decided to omit the House vote of 1973 from our main estimations. Thus, we are left with
3,068 observations (i.e., all the votes from 1974 until 2002, as reported in Table 1).
Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the list of manufacturing industries included in our anal-
ysis. For each year, we deﬁne an industry as being import (export), if the U.S. as a whole is a
net importer (exporter) for that industry in that year. Using employment data by congressional
district—constructed from county-level data as discussed above—and by state, we compute the
number of employees in import and export industries for all constituencies. Our theoretical
model suggests that FTA voting decisions should be driven by the extent to which the trade
policy interests of the legislators—who are assumed to stand for their own constituencies—diﬀer
from those of the President—who is supposed to represent all constituencies. For each con-
37The CBP series mostly contains data on employment in manufacturing industries, with very little detailed
information for the agricultural sector. However, manufacturing industries represent the lion’s share of total
imports and exports of the United States (i.e., at least 70 percent in each year from 1970 until today). Moreover,
many agriculture-related activities are classiﬁed as manufacturing and are thus included in our dataset (e.g.,
dairy products, grain mill products, and sugar are included in SIC 20 and NAICS 311). In Section 7, where we
report the results of various robustness checks, we include information on agriculture employment, as well as on
employment in the service sector.
28stituency i at time t, we then deﬁne the ratio of employees in export industries (indexed by x)
relative to import-competing industries (indexed by m) and then we construct the same ratio

























Our main regressor of interest, Λi
t, captures a constituency’s Trade exposure relative to the











Figure 11: Trade exposure
Figure 11 above plots the empirical distribution of Λt
i for the full sample of 3,068 votes.
Based on this, following our theoretical model, we can classify congressmen as representatives








t ∈ [0,1 − g)
C if Λi
t ∈ [1 − g,1 + g]
S if Λi
t ∈ (1 + g,∞].
(18)
Notice that g = 0 would provide the exact theoretical deﬁnition of the neutral C districts,
which are assumed to share the same trade policy interests as the entire country. However, this
methodology has no empirical content, since in the data none of the constituencies is charac-
terized by a value of Λi
t that is exactly equal to unity. To ensure that the empirical analysis
captures the spirit of our theoretical model, we have thus experimented with alternative small
values of g, deﬁned as a fraction (0.20, 0.25, and 0.30) of the standard deviation of Λi
t. As it
is shown in Figure 12, alternative cut-oﬀ values of g give rise to diﬀerent classiﬁcations of the
legislators’ identity and, correspondingly, of Congress composition. However, it is important to
stress that, independently on the chosen value of g, there is never a situation in which M or S
representatives have a majority in Congress.38 This is not surprising given that Figure 11 shows
a relatively symmetric distribution of the trade orientation of the districts, with a median value
of 0.99. Therefore, out of the four theoretical scenarios of Section 4.3, only those characterized





























































Figure 12: Congress composition for alternative values of g
Based on the deﬁnition of the legislators’ types in (18), we can construct the variable ShareC
t ,
which captures the share of Congress controlled by representatives on non-specialized constituen-
cies in a given year (corresponding to the parameter β
C in our theoretical model).
38This is true even for very small values of g. In the limit case of g = 0, M and S legislators have nearly
identical shares in Congress. The same description applies when we look at the distribution of Λt
i year by year.
30Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev.
Votei
t 3,068 0.697 0.460
Trade exposurei
t 3,068 1.194 0.829
Senatei 3,068 0.207 0.405
Democrati
t 3,068 0.559 0.497
Conservative ratingi
t 3,065 46.70 37.45
Party as Presidenti
t 3,068 0.495 0.500
Swing statei
t 3,068 0.513 0.500
President’s statei
t 3,068 0.705 0.456
Uniﬁed governmentt 3,068 0.328 0.470
Summary statistics for the main variables of interest are reported in Table 4. In terms of trade
exposure of each district relative to the U.S. at large, notice that the mean of our Trade exposure
measure is slightly higher than 1; this is because, as it is apparent looking at Figure 11, some
districts are outliers with respect to their high shares of employees in export industries. Table
4 also reports summary statistics for all the other variables used as controls in our regressions.
Although the theoretical model is silent on their role, they have been used in other studies of the
determinants of congressional votes on trade policy. To uncover possible diﬀerences between the
two chambers of Congress, we include a Senate dummy. To proxy for congressmen’s ideology,
we use the Democrat dummy and the Conservative rating index provided by the American
Conservative Union (ACU), which ranks congressmen on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher
scores assigned to more conservative politicians. We also include the following dummy variables:
Party as President, which is equal to one for congressmen belonging to the same party as the
executive, and zero otherwise; Swing state, which identiﬁes battleground states, in which no
Presidential candidate had an overwhelming majority in the previous election;39 President’s
state, which is equal to one for states which were carried by the incumbent President in the
previous election; and Uniﬁed government, which captures scenarios in which the majority in
both chambers and the President belong to the same political party.40
6 Empirical Methodology and Results
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis, V otei
t, is dichotomous and equals one if the
congressman has voted in favor of granting or extending FTA and zero otherwise. Our baseline
39We follow Glaeser and Ward (2006) in deﬁning swing states as those with a margin of victory less than 10
percent in the last presidential election. The results are unchanged when we use a 5 percent threshold.
40Other political economy variables could not be included, such as the degree of protectionism of the President
(since there is no measure of the executive’s trade policy stance) or the inﬂuence of interest groups (since it is
not possible to collect data on trade-related campaign contributions for the entire period of our analysis).
31speciﬁcation is thus given by
Prob(V ote
i







where Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution (i.e., probit model); Xi
t is a matrix of district-
speciﬁc variables, which are deﬁned for each constituency i; Z is a matrix of additional controls,
which may or may not be time-invariant and district speciﬁc (e.g., time or state ﬁxed eﬀects);
and α, β1, and β2 are the vectors of parameters to be estimated. Depending on the speciﬁcation,
the main variable of interest is a district’s Trade exposurei
t, Λi
t, or the share of neutral district
representatives in Congress, ShareC
t . In order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimated
coeﬃcients, in the tables we report marginal eﬀects (calculated at the mean of each regressor).
Moving to the results, we ﬁrst want to assess the validity of the voting prediction contained
in Proposition 3, according to which the likelihood that a legislator will vote in favor of FTA
should increase with the degree to which his constituency is relatively export-oriented compared
to the U.S. as a whole. To capture the trade policy preferences of the legislators’ constituencies
we employ the continuous variable Λi
t. The results for this speciﬁcation are presented in Table
5 below.
In column (1) we report a speciﬁcation where the only explanatory variable are the districts’
Trade exposure and the set of year eﬀects. The prediction of the theoretical model is clearly
conﬁrmed by the data, as the estimated coeﬃcient of Trade exposure is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level.41 In other words, a congressman is more likely to vote in favor of granting
or extending FTA the more export oriented his district is compared to the U.S. as a whole. The
set of year ﬁxed eﬀects is jointly signiﬁcant and their coeﬃcients indicate a decreasing likelihood
over time of voting in favor of FTA, suggesting an erosion of the consensus in favor of trade
liberalization.42
The remainder of the table contains a series of robustness checks, to investigate the role
played by the additional drivers of FTA voting decisions identiﬁed by the existing literature. In
all speciﬁcations reported in columns (2)-(11) the congressman’s district trade exposure continues
to be positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with FTA voting.
41In the simplest possible speciﬁcation, in which we drop the year ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient for Trade Exposure
is also positive and signiﬁcant at 1 percent. The estimates of various ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported to save on
space. All the results and tests not reported in the text are available upon requests.
42Such trend may be due to various factors, including a strong increase in trade volumes, which may have lead
to larger adjustment costs associated with trade liberalization, and increasing concerns over non-trade issues such
as labor and environmental standards (see Elliot, 2000).
32Table 5: Empirical results for all constituencies
House Senate
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Trade exposurei
t 0.032*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.075***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.026)
Senatei 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.091***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Democrati
t -0.286*** -0.288*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.299*** -0.328*** -0.148***
















Trend -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year eﬀects included included included included included included included included
State eﬀects included included included included included included included included included included
Observations 3,068 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,048 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051 2,506 476
Log likel. -1,550.18 -1,442.63 -1,419.35 -1,269.48 -1,294.37 -1,269.24 -1,353.52 -1,353.75 -1,340.63 -1,049.34 -174.50
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.31
χ2 478.35*** 570.05*** 566.90*** 546.11*** 541.67*** 540.46*** 592.91*** 593.65*** 622.31*** 454.25*** 147.63***
Pred. Prob. 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.86
Notes: Dependent variable, Votei
t, equal to 1 if congressman votes in favor of FTA, 0 otherwise. Marginal eﬀects reported for all regressors,
calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level; **
5% level; * 10% level.We start in column (2) by controlling for unobservable, additive state-speciﬁc eﬀects, which
we will retain throughout the remainder of the table.43 We then investigate the role of Senate
membership in explaining FTA voting decision (column (3)). Interestingly, senators turn out
to be in general more likely to favor FTA.44 This result holds also when we control for the role
played by the ideological position of the congressman, and for whether or not he belongs to the
party of the President (columns (4)-(6)). The same is true also when we account for political
characteristics of the state (columns (7) and (8)) and for the alignment of the executive and the
legislative branches (column (9)).
As for the various controls we have introduced in our analysis, ideology, measured both as
party aﬃliation (column (4)) as well as conservative rating (column (5)), inﬂuences FTA voting
decisions. In particular, our results show that Republicans and more conservative members of
Congress are signiﬁcantly more likely to vote in favor of granting fast track authority to the
executive. These ﬁndings are in line with previous evidence showing that, for the period we are
considering, Republican congressmen tend to be more pro trade (see Hiscox, 1999, and Karol,
2000). Alignment with the party of the President (column (6)) instead does not seem to play a
signiﬁcant role, once we control for the congressman’s party aﬃliation. This is consistent with
the fact that Republicans are more likely to vote in favor of FTA and most FTA votes occurred
under a Republican President: only three rounds of the votes listed in Table 1 occurred under
a Democrat President (i.e., the Trade Agreement of Act of 1979 under President Carter; the
extension of FTA in 1993 for completing the Uruguay Round, and the failed extension of FTA
in 1998 under President Clinton).
Political features of the states where the congressman was elected do not seem to play a role.
In particular, legislators elected in swing states (column (7)) or in states won by the President
in the last election (column (8)) are no more/less likely to vote in favor of FTA. On the other
hand, the likelihood of a vote in favor of FTA is higher when the majority of both the House
and the Senate belongs to the political party of the President (column (9)).45 Notice that, since
the year ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be introduced in the speciﬁcations of columns (7)-(9),46 we have
43The state ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly signiﬁcant. Notice also that the inclusion of state eﬀects forces us to drop
the 17 observations for the congressmen from Wyoming, since they all and always voted in favor of FTA.
44The marginal eﬀect in column (3) tells us that a Senator is on average 6.3 percentage points more likely to
vote for FTA than a House representative, implying an 8 percent increase over the average predicted probability
of a positive vote reported at the bottom of the table. Interpreting the marginal eﬀects of the Trade exposure
variable is more diﬃcult, since they measure the impact of a marginal change in the trade exposure ratio as
deﬁned in (17).
45We have also investigated the eﬀects of presidential term limits by including a dummy variable for votes
casted during the second term of a presidential mandate, but the estimated coeﬃcients for this variable were
never signiﬁcant. The only votes which took place during a second mandate were the Senate and House votes in
1988 (Reagan administration) and the House vote in 1998 (Clinton administration).
46Swing state and President’s state cannot be included with year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, since there is no
variation within states for a given year. For the variable Uniﬁed government, there is no within-year variation.
34replaced them with a linear trend. Consistently with the decreasing support for FTA over time,
the estimated coeﬃcient for this trend is signiﬁcant at 1 percent and negative.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 5 we separately investigate FTA voting behavior of
members of the House and the Senate.47 In both cases, the marginal eﬀects for the Trade exposure
variable are positive and signiﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃcient for the Democract dummy is
negative and signiﬁcant for both chambers, though their magnitude suggests that ideology plays
a bigger role in the voting behavior of House representatives.
We then turn to evaluate the prediction of Proposition 4, according to which, when no group
of district representatives holds a majority, the likelihood that representatives of non-specialized
constituencies vote in favor of FTA should decrease with their relative share in Congress. To
assess the validity of this prediction, we examine the voting behavior of congressmen from C
constituencies, as a function of their share of seats, ShareC
t .
To deﬁne C districts, our benchmark analysis reported in Table 6 is based on setting g in
equation (18) equal to 0.25 of the standard deviation of the trade orientation variable, Λi
t. In
Section 7, we will carry out a series of robustness checks using alternative values of g and obtain
similar results. Notice that, since our main regressor of interest, ShareC
t , is year-speciﬁc, we
have included a linear time trend rather than year ﬁxed eﬀects. In line with our ﬁndings in
Table 5, the estimated coeﬃcient for this variable is always signiﬁcant at 1 percent and negative,
suggesting that voting for FTA becomes less likely over time.48
Table 6 contains six diﬀerent speciﬁcations where only the votes of representatives from C
constituencies are included as the dependent variable. In all cases, our results are consistent
with Proposition 4: the estimated coeﬃcient for ShareC
t is always negative and signiﬁcant at 1
percent, indicating that representatives of neutral constituencies are less likely to vote in favor of
fast track the higher their share of seats in Congress. This suggests that the strategic delegation
mechanisms outlined in our theoretical analysis play indeed a role in the FTA voting behavior
of U.S. congressmen.
As for the eﬀect of the additional controls, their impact is very similar to the results reported
in Table 5: senators are also more likely to vote in favor of FTA; Republican and more conser-
vative legislators are more favorable; the fact that a congressman is from a swing state or from
a state that was won by the President in the last election has no eﬀect on FTA voting behavior;
the likelihood of a vote in favor of FTA is higher when the executive and the majority in both
chambers are aligned in terms of party aﬃliation. The only noticeable diﬀerence with the results
of Table 5 is that the dummy variable for the alignment between a legislator and the President
47Some more observations are lost because of no variation in the dependent variable within the House and/or
the Senate for some States.
48Notice that, if we exclude the variable Trend from the set of controls, the coeﬃcient for ShareC
t remains
negative and signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
35is now signiﬁcant and positive when included along with the Democrat dummy.
Table 6: Empirical results for C constituencies
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ShareC
t -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Senatei 0.126** 0.126** 0.124** 0.128** 0.126** 0.121**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Democrati
t -0.352*** -0.343*** -0.351*** -0.353*** -0.351***















Trend -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
State eﬀects included included included included included included
Observations 849 848 849 849 849 849
Log likelihood -371.37 -374.11 -369.18 -371.06 -371.17 -368.00
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
χ2 213.04*** 209.10*** 209.83*** 216.51*** 216.14*** 219.66***
Predicted Prob. 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74
Notes: Dependent variable, Votei
t, equal to 1 if congressman votes in favor of FTA, 0
otherwise. Marginal eﬀects reported for all regressors, calculated as discrete changes
from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. Only congressmen from C constituencies (based on
g = 0.25) are included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes signiﬁcance
at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
7 Robustness Checks
In this section, we carry out a series of additional estimations to assess the robustness of our
empirical results. All the speciﬁcations not explicitly reported are available upon request.
We have ﬁrst undertaken some experiments to evaluate the robustness of our results with
respect to alternative deﬁnitions of congressmen’s identity. In particular, for our baseline re-
gressions of Table 6, we have classiﬁed legislators as being representatives of non-specialized C
36constituencies by setting g in equation (18) equal to 0.20 of the standard deviation of Λi
t. In Ta-
ble 7 below, we report the results of speciﬁcations based on alternative cut-oﬀ values of g, which
still correspond to scenarios in which none of the legislator types has a majority in Congress
(see Figure 12). In all the speciﬁcations, in line with the prediction of Proposition 4, an increase
in the share of C representatives leads to a decline in the probability that these legislators will
vote in favor of granting fast track authority to the executive.
Table 7: Robustness checks based on alternative deﬁnitions of C districts
g = 0.20 g = 0.30
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ShareC
t -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.015** -0.018*** -0.016**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Senatei 0.099* 0.103* 0.095 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122**
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044)
Democrati
t -0.340*** -0.334*** -0.351*** -0.343***







Trend -0.16*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
State eﬀects included included included included included included
Observations 658 657 658 1,061 1,059 1,061
Log likelihood -280.65 -282.27 -279.84 -452.92 -457.47 -449.29
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34
χ2 186.94*** 193.76*** 184.31*** 295.23*** 457.47*** 288.48***
Predicted Prob. 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.72
Notes: Dependent variable, Votei
t, equal to 1 if congressman votes in favor of FTA, 0 otherwise.
Marginal eﬀects reported for all regressors, calculated as discrete changes from 0 to 1 for dummy
variables. Only congressmen from C constituencies are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis; *** denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
The second set of robustness checks are related to our measure of Trade exposure. As men-
tioned above, the CBP series mostly contains data on employment in manufacturing industries,
with very little detailed information about employment in agriculture. To separately assess the
role of agriculture in shaping individual congressmen behavior, we have thus tried to include
as an additional control in all our regressions the share of population employed in agriculture
in each congressional district, which can be obtained from the Census of Agriculture. In all
cases, the estimated coeﬃcient was negative but not signiﬁcant, and there was no qualitative or
quantitative change for the other explanatory variables.
37The deﬁnition of Trade exposure that was used in our baseline regressions also excluded data
on services, even if the CBP series do include information on employment in some service sectors.
This is because there is no available data on trade in services by the same SIC or NAICS codes
used by the CBP, which prevents us from directly classifying various activities as being import-
competing or export oriented. Trade data on services can be derived from the IMF balance of
payments (BoP) statistics, but is only available in large groupings (e.g., transportation, travel,
construction).
We have manually matched SIC and NAICS codes to the categories of services available
from the BoP statistics. Detailed service data by major categories are only available from 1986
onwards (e.g., the categories ‘Construction’ and ‘Computer and information services’ were not
reported in earlier years). Thus, when using service data we had to restrict our sample to the
votes that occurred from 1988 onward. Table A.2 in the Appendix reports the correspondences
that we created in order to use CBP data on employment for service-related sectors. Unfortu-
nately, we could not match some service sectors to speciﬁc SIC or NAICS code. The included
sectors account on average for more than 70 percent of the value of services exports and imports
for the years included in our empirical analysis. Constructing our measure of Trade exposure
including service data, we obtain a distribution of this variable which is characterized by fewer
extreme values (i.e., the maximum value is 6.3 compared to 9.5 in Figure 11) and a smaller
standard deviation (i.e., 0.74 versus 0.83).49
The results of two of our main speciﬁcations are reported in Table 8. Columns (1) and (3)
replicate the earlier results with data only on manufacturing on the shorter sample period for
which service data are available (i.e., votes from 1988) in order to allow a direct comparison of
the eﬀect of including employment in the service sectors. The reported marginal eﬀects show
that the qualitative results are unchanged although the point estimates are somewhat larger
than in the benchmark speciﬁcations of Tables 5 and 6. When we also include service data, all
the results continue to hold. In column (2), the coeﬃcient on Trade exposure is positive and
signiﬁcant at 1 percent. The estimate for ShareC
t in speciﬁcation (4) is also in line with column
(3), though the results reported in these two columns are based on diﬀerent observations, since
the identity of C constituencies is inﬂuenced by the inclusion of employment in service sectors.
Thus, our main ﬁndings concerning the FTA voting behavior of U.S. congressmen are robust to
the inclusion of services, even if the use of service data presents various problems, not least that
our sample period is reduced.
49This is likely to be the result of the lower geographic concentration of services compared to manufacturing.
38Table 8: Robustness checks including services
Including Including
services services







Senatei 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.159*** 0.162***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.051) (0.053)
Democrati
t -0.367*** -0.374*** -0.420*** -0.424***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.037)
Trend -0.013** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.005)
Year eﬀects included included
State eﬀects included included included included
Observations 2,484 2,484 877 693
Log likelihood -1,550.18 -1,193.51 -418.48 -336.11
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.26
χ2 493.67*** 488.05*** 236.73*** 166.11***
Predicted Prob. 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.68
Notes: Dependent variable, Votei
t, equal to 1 if congressman votes in favor of FTA, 0
otherwise. Marginal eﬀects reported for all regressors, calculated as discrete changes
from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. Data are from the period 1988-2002. Only con-
gressmen from C constituencies (based on g = 0.30) are included in columns (3) and
(4). Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level; **
5% level; * 10% level.
A ﬁnal check concerning our measure of Trade exposure focuses on within-county hetero-
geneity. Recall that we have constructed employment variables for congressional districts by
aggregating county-level data. For those counties which are split between diﬀerent districts, we
have imputed employees proportionally to the share of the population of a county assigned to
that district. This procedure may lead to an imprecise measurement of Trade exposure for those
counties that span many districts, if they are very diverse in terms of the geographic distribution
of production activities. To deal with this issue, we have performed our estimations leaving out
those counties which are split in more than ten districts, i.e., Los Angeles county in California
(17 congressional districts) and Cook county in Illinois (12 congressional districts). The results
were not aﬀected.
A third set of robustness checks concerns our methodology. Instead of using robust standard
errors, we have clustered the errors by constituency, thus allowing for intra-group correlation
over time. Notice that standard errors can only be clustered by state and not by congressional
39districts. This is because, as discussed in section 5, congressional districts are redeﬁned by the
Census every ten years, implying that the clusters would change over time. When we follow this
approach, the sign and signiﬁcance levels of our main variables of interest in all the speciﬁcations
presented in Section 6 are unchanged.
As an additional robustness check, we have estimated our main speciﬁcations by decades in
order to put more emphasis on cross-sectional variation instead of the time dimension. To this
end, we have deﬁned three subsamples following each decennial Census starting with the ﬁrst
year for which the new districts were deﬁned, i.e., 1973-1982, 1983-1992, and 1993-2002. The
results for the two more recent decades are qualitatively similar to the ones reported earlier for
the full sample, while this is not the true for the ﬁrst subsample. However, analyzing the ﬁrst
decade in isolation is not very meaningful since the data do not exhibit much variation as the
votes in 1974 and 1979 passed with an overwhelming majority (see Table 1) and the vote of 1973
is not included because of data problems (see discussion in Section 2).
We have also experimented with a series of minor variations of our main speciﬁcations. For
example, we have tried substituting the year ﬁxed eﬀects with U.S. wide macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as GDP growth and unemployment rates. While the coeﬃcients of these regressors
were mostly signiﬁcant and positive, the qualitative results of our analysis remained unchanged.
We have also performed estimations using only the sample of congressional votes on FTA, ex-
cluding votes which also included other trade provisions. This subset includes only the votes
which took place in 1991, 1993 and 1998 (see Table 1 above). The results showed no substantial
qualitative change when restricting the sample in this way.
In general, our empirical analysis provides strong support for the theoretical predictions of
our model concerning legislators’ FTA voting behavior (Propositions 3 and 4 above). Other
control variables, even when signiﬁcant, do not aﬀect this result.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a simple two-country trade model to examine the determinants
of the decision of U.S. congressmen to grant fast track authority to the President, which entails
giving up the possibility to amend negotiated trade deals. Our model emphasizes the role played
by the size of the constituencies represented by the executive and the legislators, as well as the
geographic heterogeneity in the distribution of economic activities across constituencies. In line
with the predictions of our theoretical model, our analysis of all FTA votes taken between 1974
and 2002 shows that the legislators’ voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of
their own constituencies, as well as on the composition of the majority of Congress.
We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis for institution design. Our theo-
40retical model is focused on trade negotiations between two countries, in the presence of a crucial
asymmetry between them: in the home country, Congress can decide whether or not to delegate
trade negotiating authority to the President (granting FTA) or to retain amendment power (not
granting FTA). This modeling choice is motivated by the observation that the United States is
the only country in which Congress can decide whether or not to retain the power to amend
trade agreements. Our analysis shows that this institutional asymmetry can generate an ad-
vantage for the home country, skewing negotiated tariﬀ outcomes in its favor. This is because,
by being represented by a protectionist Congress majority, the home country can be a “tougher
bargainer” in trade negotiations, thus obtaining larger concessions from the foreign country.50
More generally, depending on the extent to which Congress is involved in the negotiations, we
can distinguish three possible institutional arrangements on which basis a country can negotiate
international trade deals:
Full delegation: a scenario in which the President retains complete decision-making power
over trade policy and trade agreements are not subject to congressional approval;
Partial delegation: a scenario in which Congress retains the power to reject trade agree-
ments negotiated by the executive;
No delegation: a scenario in which Congress retains the power to shape trade deals through
amendments.
The current U.S. institutional setting rules out the ﬁrst possibility and involves the recurrent
choice between the last two arrangements, i.e., partial delegation (FTA) and no delegation.
While our analysis has focused on the determinants of fast track voting decisions in the United
States and their implications for trade negotiations, our model can help to shed light on broader
institutional design questions that can arise in the context of international negotiations. For
example, our theoretical framework could be used to examine the implications of the three
possible institutional arrangements from the point of view of world welfare.
Our model could be easily extended in two directions, which would both tend to make
granting fast track more desirable. The ﬁrst extension involves moving to a multi-country setting.
Our two-country setup shows that home (the U.S.) can gain if Congress retains amendment
power. This conclusion may be reversed if there are more negotiating partners. This is because,
in the absence of FTA, U.S. trading partners may decide to negotiate with other countries instead.
As pointed out by Bhagwati in a recent interview with the Council of Foreign relations, “if we
50In line with this view, during the period in which President Clinton lacked FTA, it was argued that U.S.
“trading partners are negotiating with the US Congress through the administration ( ...) In eﬀect, the adminis-
tration appears to be intent on taking advantage of the anxiety of other trading partners, by asking them to pay
a price now before going to the Congress” (see www.sunsonline.org).
41don’t have fast track, we are going to lose out in the race for bilaterals. When the Europeans
try for bilaterals, we’ve sort of stopped them in their tracks by joining in and pushing for these
things ourselves. Now, we could get handicapped, because we’re the only country in the world
that requires fast track. But I’m optimistic, for a perverse reason, which is that in our own self
interest we will have to pass some form of fast track. Otherwise we’ll be big sore losers in the
world trade system” (see www.cfr.org).
The second extension involves making the model symmetric, i.e., allowing the foreign country
to have a similar institutional arrangement as the home country. This would be the case, for
example, if the EU Council of Ministers was allowed to retain the power to amend negotiated
trade agreements. In this scenario, both countries might be tempted to leave trade negotiations
in the hands of protectionist legislators, so as to attempt to skew trade agreements in their
favor. However, as suggested by the theoretical literature on strategic delegation in bargaining
(see Jones, 1989), if they both did so, they would end up being worse oﬀ than if they could
commit to delegate trade negotiations to their executives.
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44Appendix
Indiﬀerence Curves for the Home Country
In this section, we characterize the shape of the indiﬀerence curves of the various agents in our
home economy. We start by considering the preferences of the President and then turn to the
preferences of the representatives of the M, S and C constituencies.
As in Mayer (1981), we draw the indiﬀerence curves in the (τ,τ∗) space. Totally diﬀerenti-




































Notice that, since the home country imports good 1 and exports good 2, we must have M1 > 0
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< 0. (A.4)
This implies that the denominator of the term on the right hand side of equation (A.2) is
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ǫ∗ (A.5)
where ˆ τ = 1
ǫ∗ is the home country’s optimal tariﬀ as derived in (7). Therefore, for non-negative
values of τ, the slope of the home country’s indiﬀerence curves is positive, zero or negative
depending on the home country’s actual tariﬀ rate being less than, equal to, or larger than its
optimal tariﬀ.
We turn now to the indiﬀerence curves of the representatives of the various constituencies,
which determine FTA voting decisions in Congress. From equation (12) we know that the shape
of the indiﬀerence curves of the representative of constituency C is identical to the one of the
President. Consider instead the representative of the import competing M constituency. Totally
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Notice that, compared to the right hand side of equation (A.1), the numerator is bigger and the
45denominator is smaller in absolute value, since αM
1 > h > αM
2 . Thus, as shown in Figure 5, the
indiﬀerence curves of the representatives of M import constituencies are steeper than those of
the C representative and/or of the home country as a whole. From this, it immediately follows
that M representative’s most preferred domestic tariﬀ ˆ tM is larger than the tariﬀ most preferred
by the executive, i.e.,
ˆ τ
M > ˆ τ = ˆ τ
C. (A.7)
Consider now the representative of the S constituency. Totally diﬀerentiating equation (11) and




















∂τ∗ + h ∂Ω
∂τ∗
  (A.8)
Notice that, compared to the right hand side of equation (A.1), the numerator is smaller and the
denominator is bigger in absolute value as αS
2 > h > αS
1. Thus, for each τ, the indiﬀerence curve
of the representative of the S constituency is ﬂatter than the indiﬀerence curve of the President
and/or representative C. As a result, representative S most preferred tariﬀ ˆ τ
S is smaller than
the tariﬀ most preferred by the executive. Thus, we have established the following ranking of
optimal domestic tariﬀs for the legislators in the home country:
ˆ τ
M > ˆ τ = ˆ τ
C =
1
ǫ∗ > ˆ τ
S. (A.9)
Characterization of the Contract Curve (CC locus)
We can now proceed to characterize the set of eﬃcient agreements between the home and foreign
country. We start by considering the set of eﬃcient agreements that could be signed by the
Presidents of the two trading partners. This set is represented by the combinations of tariﬀ
levels (τ,τ∗) for the two countries such that their indiﬀerence curves are tangent to each other.














To characterize the contract curve between the two welfare-maximizing executives, we simply









and recalling that M1 = −M∗
1 and that M∗
2 = −M2, the set of eﬃcient agreements between the
two Presidents must then satisfy the condition
(1 − τǫ
∗)(1 − τ
∗ǫ) − 1 = 0 (A.12)
This condition implies that the set of eﬃcient agreements goes through the origin, i.e., through
the free trade point.
46Table A.1: List of SIC and NAICS industries
SIC Description
20 Food and Kindred Products
21 Tobacco Products
22 Textile Mill Products
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics and Similar Materials
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture
25 Furniture and Fixtures
26 Paper and Allied Products
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries
28 Chemicals and Allied Products
29 Petroleum Reﬁning and Related Industries
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products
31 Leather and Leather Products
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products
33 Primary Metal Industries
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer
Equipment
37 Transportation Equipment
38 Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and
Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
NAICS Description
311 Food Manufacturing
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing
313 Textile Mills
314 Textile Product Mills
315 Apparel Manufacturing
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
321 Wood Product Manufacturing
322 Paper Manufacturing
323 Printing and Related Support Activities
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
325 Chemical Manufacturing
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
333 Machinery Manufacturing
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
47Table A.2: Correspondences used for service data
BoP deﬁnition SIC categories NAICS categories
Transportation 44: Water transportation 481: Air Transportation
and Travel 45: Transportation by air 483: Water transportation
46: Pipelines, except natural gas 484: Truck transportation
485: Transit and ground passenger transportation
486: Pipeline transportation
487: Scenic and sightseeing transportation
488: Support activities for transportation
Telecommunications 48: Communications 513: Broadcasting and telecommunications
services
Construction 15: Building construction general contractors and operative builders 233: Building, developing, and general contracting
services 16: Heavy construction other than building construction contractors 234: Heavy construction
17: Construction special trade contractors 235: Special trade contractors
Computer and 73: Business services 514: Information services and data processing services
information services & 81: Legal services 541: Professional, scientiﬁc, and technical services
Other business services 87: Engineering, accounting, research, management, and related services 551: Management of companies and enterprises
561: Administrative and support services
Note: We excluded the sectors ‘Postal and courier services’, ‘Royalties and license fees’, ‘Insurance services’, ‘Financial services’, ‘Personal,
cultural, and recreational services’, and ‘Government services’, for which IMF BoP data could not be matched to SIC/NAICS categories.
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